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Christoph Halbig
The Philosopher as Polyphemus? 
Philosophy and Common Sense in Jacobi and Hegel
Lessing: Und wer nicht erklären will?
Vor dem Hintergrund zeitgenössischer Versuche innerhalb der analytischen Philosophie, 
die traditionellen Frontstellungen der epistemologischen Realismus / Idealismusdebatte 
zugunsten eines direkten epistemologischen Realismus im Rahmen einer therapeu-
tischen Auffasung philosophischer Refl exion zu überwinden, analysiert der Beitrag 
die zwischen Hegel und Jacobi geführte Debatte um den Status des unmittelbaren 
Wissens. Gegenüber der verbreiteten Gegenüberstellung von Hegel als Vertreter einer 
hypertrophen, idealistischen Systemphilosophie einerseits, Jacobi als „entschiedenem“ 
und philosophiekritischem Realisten andererseits wird, ausgehend von einer Rekon-
struktion der Grundstruktur von Jacobis Epistemologie und der Auseinandersetzung 
Hegels mit ihr in seiner Jacobi-Rezension sowie im Vorbegriff der enzyklopädischen 
Logik, die These vertreten, daß Hegel und Jacobi dasselbe epistemologische Ziel, 
nämlich die Verteidigung eines direkten, anti-repräsentationalistischen und anti-skepti-
schen Realismus verfolgen. Ihre Auffassungen divergieren erst auf metaphilosophischer 
Ebene in der Frage nach dem Status epistemologischer Refl exion und deren Bedeutung 
für die Sicherung der berechtigten Erkenntnisansprüche des common sense gegenüber 
philosophischen Zweifeln. 
1. Introduction: The call for a second naiveté 
The problem of realism has stood in the center of philosophical refl ection 
for centuries: although ancient philosophy arguably lacks the resources to 
formulate the realism / idealism issue in its familiar modern meaning,1 it has 
beset philosophical debates since the early modern age. Today, however, 
there is a growing feeling that the realism debate has reached an impasse 
which calls for a change of philosophical method. Instead of trying to solve 
the issue by ever more complex philosophical system building, the prob-
lem itself has become problematic: “Why has realism become a problem?” 
(Putnam, 1999, p. 9), Hilary Putnam asks in his Dewey Lectures. The obvi-
ous hope behind the question is that a genealogical analysis of the problem 
might show that it essentially rests on misguided assumptions which do not 
withstand closer scrutiny. Once these assumptions are rejected the problem 
can be recognized to be what it was all along – a product of philosophical 
1 Cf. Burnyeat, 1982. 
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misunderstandings and self-imposed constraints. At this point the business 
of philosophy is basically fi nished; philosophy can give way to the second 
naiveté2 of an undisturbed common sense and might retain only the role of 
a watchdog against possible, inadvertent attempts at resuscitating its own 
tradition. In a similar vein, John McDowell sees his own approach to the 
realism problem in Mind and World as an essay in therapeutic rather than 
constructive philosophy: according to McDowell constructive philosophy is 
doomed to the vain attempt to bridge gulfs (between subject and object, mind 
and matter and so forth), which it has itself opened, by taking its stand on 
one side of the gulf and clumsily trying to rebuild the other side out of the 
materials at hand where it happens to stand. (McDowell, 1994, pp. 93 ff.)3 
Therapeutic philosophy on the other hand lays bare the hidden assumptions 
behind these problems and thus opens the way for therapy. The patient might 
not be totally cured from the philosophical impulse,4 but he should not be 
any longer obsessed by philosophical doubts that turn his natural being-in-
the-world into a mystery. 
A central concern of therapeutic philosophy has been to rehabilitate the 
sense of a genuine openness of the world to our cognitive faculties. Philoso-
phers such as John McDowell and Hilary Putnam oppose a direct, natural or 
“common sense” realism, which holds that the objects of veridical perception 
are external things, to an interface model of cognition, according to which 
cognition reaches out not to the external things themselves but only to mental 
“ideas” or their naturalized equivalents in contemporary cognitive science.5 
Such a model turns perception into a bipartite, partly cognitive, partly causal 
process and thus proves structurally incapable of fending off skeptical and 
idealistic objections. Once these terms of the problem have been accepted, 
the question of how persons can be in genuine cognitive contact with the 
world has indeed become an unsolvable mystery. But these terms should not 
be accepted, as the therapeutic realists remind us.
The call for a second naiveté, which resounds today in all the core areas 
of analytic philosophy, has also shed new, interesting light on the history of 
philosophy: not only American pragmatism and the Wittgensteinian tradition 
but also ancient and classical German philosophy have been examined in 
the light of recent interest in regaining a natural realism – sometimes with 
surprising results:6 John McDowell for instance has voiced the hope that 
2 Cf. Putnam, 1999, p. 14 ff.
3 Cf. McDowell, 1994, p. 124. 
4 See McDowell, 1994, p. 177. 
5 See Putnam, 1999, pp. 10 ff. for the reasons why he prefers the Jamesian term “natural 
realism” to the more common “direct realism.” 
6 Putnam, for example, reaches back to Aristotle for a statement of epistemological 
realism he himself is sympathetic with although he considers it partly compromised 
by the metaphysical background (see Putnam, 1994, part I; Putnam, 1999, p. 4).
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even Hegel’s philosophy – traditionally seen as a good candidate for the most 
constructive philosophy ever conceived – could profi tably be understood as 
an unusual attempt at doing therapeutic philosophy. (McDowell, 2000, p. 
29) Much of the debate, however, is hampered by sweeping generalizations: 
modern philosophy since Descartes often appears to be a quasi-Heideggerian 
history of decline, in which philosophy gets more and more involved in self-
created problems, until American pragmatism, Wittgenstein or whomever you 
choose for this role, puts an end to the pseudo-problem of realism. 
Instead of simply nominating another candidate for this messianic role, I 
will opt completely out of the business of looking for forerunners or “grand-
fathers” of common problems and their alleged solutions. I shall try instead to 
reconstruct some aspects of a debate that involved most of what is now called 
“German idealism.” I hope that this debate will provide systematic insights 
that might prove valuable for contemporary discussions precisely with respect 
to those of its features which might look most strange or idiosyncratic from a 
modern perspective. This debate was centered on the question of the meaning 
and status of “immediate knowledge” [unmittelbares Wissen], a term forged in 
its technical meaning by Hegel, who applied it to Jacobi’s philosophy. Jacobi 
himself reacted in his epistemological works against what he considered to 
be an ultimately inverted, idealistic Spinozism, which in his view pervaded 
the works of his most distinguished contemporaries from Kant to Fichte and 
Schelling. This debate connects two problems that still beset our contemporary 
discussion in a very illuminating way, viz. the epistemological problem of how 
to regain a sense of a genuine contact of cognition with reality and the metho-
dological problem of what role philosophy has to play in this endeavor. 
I shall approach this debate via an analysis of Jacobi’s epistemological 
and metaphilosophical theory and Hegel’s critique of this theory. Jacobi’s 
philosophy occupied Hegel’s interest at several stages of his philosophical 
career. Whereas in his Glauben und Wissen (1802) Hegel provided a rather 
dismissive treatment of Jacobi’s philosophy, he later reached a more nuanced 
and sympathetic stance towards him. In the following I will mainly focus on 
two complementary texts that refl ect Hegel’s mature position: his review of 
the third volume of Jacobi’s Werke in the Heidelbergische Jahrbücher der 
Literatur (1817) and the Third Position of Thought about Objectivity in the 
Preliminary Notion [Vorbegriff ] of the Encyclopedic Logic.7
7 For an analysis of the Third Position see Westphal, 1988, and Halbig, 2002, chapter 
8. The Third Position has generally had – in my view – an undeserved bad press both 
in Hegel and in Jacobi-scholarship. To mention only two examples: Stekeler-Weitho-
fer regards it as a matter of fact, “daß Hegel diese Art der Philosophie [sc. die der 
Unmittelbarkeit] als einen Rückfall hinter Kant begreift” (Stekeler-Weithofer, 1992, p. 
88), without noticing the crucial respects in which Hegel agrees with Jacobi against 
Kant. Sandkaulen in her recent study of Jacobi’s philosophy has come to a very harsh 
conclusion about the value of the Third Position as an analysis and critique of Jacobi: 
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At a fi rst glance there seems to be little doubt about the role Hegel and 
Jacobi play in this debate: Jacobi repeatedly calls himself a “decided realist” 
[entschiedener Realist],8 who tries to defy the pretensions of philosophical 
system builders in the name of undistorted common sense. Hegel, on the 
other hand, just dismisses the claims of common sense out of hand and 
supplants them with hypertrophical, idealistic system. On this picture, it is 
no wonder that Hegel comes back so persistently to Jacobi: he has found in 
him a convenient stalking horse that he can make use of from time to time 
to demonstrate the utter irrelevance of the common sense standpoint for the 
task of systematic philosophy. 
I am going to defend the thesis that this infl uential reading of Hegel’s 
critique of Jacobi not only distorts the positions of both philosophers alike 
but also shifts out of focus precisely those of its features which are the 
most illuminating within the context of contemporary debates in theoretical 
philosophy. In my view Jacobi and Hegel share a common, epistemological 
goal: they both try to regain a direct realism that is anti-representational, 
externalist and anti-skeptical. Therefore they are united in their opposition 
to British empiricism, to Kantian transcendental idealism and to Fichte’s Wis-
senschaftslehre. Where they differ is in the role they attribute to philosophy 
in this endeavor: Jacobi oscillates between an anti-philosophical stance that 
calls for a self-destruction of philosophical refl ection on the one hand, and an 
attempt to secure the philosophical foundations for an undisturbed common 
sense by providing it with the necessary epistemological and metaphysical 
underpinnings on the other. Hegel, in contrast, tries to prove that such an 
oscillation can be avoided only by either giving up philosophy completely, 
which leaves one defenseless against the epistemological challenges inherent 
in modern culture, or by sharing his project of a philosophical system, which 
satisfi es the strongest demands of justifi cation possible by showing the place 
of common sense within the process of the self-unfolding of the Idea as the 
single, all-encompassing and necessarily complete metaphysical structure. 
2. Jacobi’s “decided realism”
To read someone who calls himself a “decided realist” as precisely that – a 
realist – does not sound very exciting. But in point of fact it is. Jacobi stated 
his “decided realism” in such an unusually muddled way that, to mention only 
“[Man kann] ohne weiteres feststellen, daß man darüber, was Jacobis genuine Position 
auch nur annähernd träfe und durchsichtig machte, von Hegel tatsächlich nichts erfährt” 
(Sandkaulen, 2000, p. 231). I hope to show here that Sandkaulen fails to do justice 
both to Jacobi’s achievements as an epistemologist and to Hegel’s in many respects 
perceptive critique of his position. 
8 Cf. Jacobi, II, p. 165. 
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one striking example, the author of the only monograph on his epistemology 
could end up classifying him (as well as Thomas Reid (!)) as a follower of 
Berkeley’s subjective idealism.9 At least four reasons should be distinguished 
which are responsible for the extreme diffi culties standing in the way of any 
attempt to reconstruct Jacobi’s own contribution to epistemology:
First, the point of departure for Jacobi’s philosophy is nearly always 
a polemical one: He is arguing against, say, the Spinozism implicit in En-
lightenment philosophy, Fichte’s alleged atheism and Schelling’s pantheism. 
It is not by chance that Jacobi was the key fi gure in nearly all the debates 
on the philosophy of religion in his lifetime and in fact triggered the three 
most important ones himself. Most of his energy was spent on formulating 
trenchant lines of criticism against heterogeneous opponents without caring 
too much about whether the standpoints from which he launched his attacks 
form a consistent pattern among themselves. 
Second, Jacobi tends to formulate sweeping oppositions;10 for Jacobi not 
only is truth one, but also all the errors of his age are only surface expres-
sions of one common error. This idea forces him into his famous equations 
of Spinozism, philosophy, pantheism, atheism, nihilism, and fatalism, and is 
responsible for many unnecessary complications in his often extremely per-
ceptive critiques of his opponents.11 One important – and for the reception 
of Jacobi’s thought in general – devastating consequence of this is the fact 
that philosophy itself falls on the error side of the “either-or”: what Jacobi 
actually means when he rather mockingly refers to his Non-philosophy 
[Unphilosophie]12 is that his own thinking avoids the mistakes that have 
surreptitiously come to defi ne the whole fi eld of philosophy. What he was 
understood to mean was that he had given up the business of arguments 
altogether. Against the charge of despising philosophy Jacobi never wearies 
of emphasizing the “philosophical intent” of his writings,13 although he still 
9 Cf. Baum, 1968, p. 106. With his claim, “daß Jacobis Anschauungen sich nicht we-
sentlich von denen Berkeleys and Thomas Reids [sic!] unterscheiden” (Baum, 1968, p. 
106), Baum however opposes older research. See Lévy-Bruhl, 1894, and especially Leo 
Strauss, 1921, who recognizes Jacobi’s “prinzipiellen” or “entschiedenen Realismus” 
(Strauss, 1997, p. 281) as the defining core of his philosophy. My own interpretation 
of Jacobi’s epistemology is much indebted to Strauss’ still valuable PhD-thesis (see 
especially part B.1. Die Erkenntnislehre) which was supervised by Ernst Cassirer and 
has only recently been published by H. Meier as part of his collected works. 
10 Hegel criticizes this feature of his philosophy as a relapse into the “either – or” of the 
metaphysical understanding. (UW, § 65) 
11 See, for example, his attempt to convict Fichte of an “inverted Spinozism” in his letter 
to Fichte. (Jacobi, 1972, p. 227) 
12 In this spirit Jacobi refers in his letter to Fichte to his “Unphilosophie, die ihr Wesen 
hat im Nicht-Wißen” as opposed to Fichte’s “Philosophie, [die ihr Wesen hat] allein 
im Wissen” (Jacobi, 1972, p. 226).
13 Cf. DH, p. 4 ff; PW, 538 ff.
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goes on using ‘philosophy’ as a term of abuse. We shall come back to the 
metaphilosophical consequences of this terminological move later. 
Third, Jacobi’s basic terminology (a) undergoes rather confusing changes 
during his philosophical development14 and (b) plays on the colloquial 
overtones of terms that are used in a stipulative sense without marking the 
semantic differences. To give only two examples: in the original edition of 
David Hume he calls Vernunft (reason) exactly that mental faculty he later 
referred to as Verstand (understanding) and opposes to Vernunft; the faculty 
he later calls Vernunft is then labelled Glaubenskraft. Glaube in its turn is 
used both as a generic term for the two sources of knowledge acknowledged 
by Jacobi, i. e. both for everyday perception and for the intuition of the 
infi nite and – somewhat nearer to common usage – as a term applying only 
to the epistemic mode that corresponds to the objects of religion (which of 
course doesn’t cover sense-perception). 
Fourth, Jacobi wavers between the stance of a defensor fi dei of orthodox 
Christianity against the pretensions of an empty “God of the philosophers” 
and an idiosyncratic statement of his own mystical conception of religion. 
A whole line of criticism focused on Jacobi’s failure to do any justice to the 
dogmatic foundations of Christian religion within the framework of his own 
epistemology and metaphysics – something which, in the light of the attacks 
on his philosophical opponents, he never tires of claiming is an indispensable 
criterion for any adequate philosophy.15
14 Jacobi himself in his introduction to his collected works (1815) confesses that in the 
original edition of his David Hume, he failed to distinguish clearly enough between “un-
derstanding” and “reason”: “What the author now objects to in this Dialogue, which was 
an early work, is that he still does not distinguish between understanding and reason in 
it with all the sharpness and determinateness he achieved in his later writings” (DH, p. 
7, cf. p. 10 ff.; PW, pp. 539-540). See the famous Supplement VII to the second edition 
of his Spinoza letters as a prominent example of his earlier use of “reason” (Supplement 
VII, p. 284 f.). In his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Hegel explicitly warns his 
audience of these terminological problems in Jacobi. Cf. MM 20, p. 318 ff.
15 See Hegel (UW, § 73 for an interpretation of this critique; cf. Halbig, 2002, p. 311, p. 
314 ff. In his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Hegel even accuses Jacobi of a 
“Betrug, wenn hier [in Jacobi] von Glaube und Offenbarung gesprochen wird, als sei 
von Glaube und Offenbarung im theologischen Sinn die Rede […]” [MM 20, p. 323]), 
who turns Jacobi’s critique of Enlightenment Philosophy against him by arguing that 
God as the object of immediate knowledge is emptied of all specific content – a “das 
Gott” is substituted for the “der Gott” of Christian faith – and especially Friedrich 
Schlegel in his 1812 review of Jacobi’s Von den göttlichen Dingen und ihrer Offenba-
rung (1811). Schlegel there reminds Jacobi that Christian orthodoxy cannot accept the 
very idea of a “natürliche und gesunde Vernunft” (Schlegel, 1988, p.167) as a source 
of knowledge of God. In the post-lapsarian state of mankind reason is for Schlegel as 
much infected by sin as the human heart and in need of God’s redeeming revelati-
on. The so-called “gesunder Menschenverstand” (common sense) itself shares in the 
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In spite of all these diffi culties, I do not consider it a hopeless endeavor 
to try to state the basic claims of Jacobi’s epistemology in a way which is 
(a) reasonably clear and (b) doesn’t prove to be incompatible with his own 
self-understanding as a staunch realist. I hope to do this in another place in 
greater detail and content myself here with providing a somewhat schematic 
overview of his position.
Jacobi’s epistemology is based on a distinction between three basic epis-
temic faculties: understanding [Verstand], sensibility [Sinnlichkeit] and reason 
[Vernunft]. The last two share a common epistemological structure (for this 
reason Jacobi groups them together under the heading of Glauben); they differ 
only in their specifi c objects: according to Jacobi, they are both perceptual 
capacities [Wahrnehmungsvermögen],16 the one directed at fi nite objects in 
space and time, the other at eternal and infi nite things. What is given us 
through these two kinds of perceptual capacities lacks conceptual content. 
Though these two are the only sources of knowledge, they are therefore unable 
to stand on their own feet, as Jacobi repeatedly admits. For him, thinking 
means judging and judging presupposes conceptual capacities as provided by 
the understanding.17 My knowledge that the weather outside is bad already 
presupposes the workings of the understanding, the “Vermögen überhaupt 
der Begriffe” (DH, p. 58; PW, p. 562). Although the bulk of Jacobi’s discus-
sion deals with the structure of our Vernunftanschauung (rational intuition) 
of God, my own rather sketchy model of his epistemology will focus on his 
theory of perception in the contemporary sense of the term. Jacobi defends 
the following theses. 
general sickness of man’s fallen nature. Against Jacobi’s attempt at isolating a higher 
faculty which remains in contact with God and has only to be rediscovered in one’s 
own heart Schlegel opposes the idea of a both morally and epistemically fallen state 
of the whole human being, recovery from which presupposes a prior admission of 
one’s own depravity and a trust in God’s grace which, however, has to come from 
outside. Schlegel even suggests applying the Verstand-Vernunft (understanding-reason) 
distinction to the two stages of this process: The term Vernunft would refer to our 
epistemic capacities in their fallen state, the term Verstand would be reserved for 
Vernunft reborn in the light of revelation and divine truth [wiedergeborene Vernunft]. 
(Cf. Schlegel, 1988, p. 168)
16 Cf. DH, p. 18; PW, p. 544 (where Jacobi refers to reason as a “higher perceptive 
capacity” [höheres Wahrnehmungsvermögen] [DH, p. 74; PW, p. 69]).
17 Cf. DH, p. 31 ff; PW, p. 550 ff. Far from dismissing the understanding out of hand, 
Jacobi ascribes a rudimentary form of it even to animals in order to account for their 
apparent perceptual skills: “Without the understanding we would have nothing in our 
senses. There would be no power to unite them intrinsically (and this power is indis-
pensable even for the life of the lowest animal): sensible-being itself would not be. In 
the same way, without the understanding we would have nothing in reason: rational 
being itself would not be” (DH, p. 26; PW, p. 547-8).
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(a) both an ontological and an epistemological realism: Jacobi claims he is 
merely restating in philosophical terms our natural faith (Naturglauben) in (i) 
the mind-independent existence of the natural world surrounding us18 and in 
(ii) the possibility of having knowledge about this world through the coopera-
tion of perception and understanding.19 Once again Jacobi seems to stand in 
his own way when he refers to his natural realism as an “incomprehensible 
miracle,”20 thus exposing it to the suspicion of obscurantism. However, closer 
scrutiny of the argumentative function of these turns of phrase shows that 
Jacobi is an experienced polemicist who is trying to turn the tables on his 
opponents: what kind of inverted world do we inhabit, he implicitly asks, 
when my statement of the obvious eludes our means of understanding and 
necessarily gives the impression of irrational stubbornness? 
(b) a direct, anti-representationalist realism: one of Jacobi’s most im-
portant epistemological goals is to show that every attempt to formulate 
an indirect, representationalist realism proves to be inherently unstable. It 
collapses into either a variety of subjective idealism which gives up realistic 
pretensions or – this is the direction favored by Jacobi himself – into his own 
Naturglauben concerning an openness of reality to our epistemic capacities 
without any interface of “mental intermediaries” (Davidson). Let me try to 
reconstruct only one strand of this argument in which he targets a causal 
theory of perception like the one defended today by Peter Strawson, among 
others: “[a] perceptual verb is used to say that a person had, is having or will 
have a sensory experience which was or will be caused by whatever it is an 
experience of” (Hyman, 1992, p. 277). According to Jacobi21 such a theory 
(i) falsifi es the phenomenology of perception: We are convinced of being in 
direct contact with reality rather than with some mental states of ours; (ii) it 
runs into regress problems: we have to postulate an experience that contains 
both the original experience which is simply caused by the object it is sup-
posed to be about and experiences this fi rst-order experience as caused in 
such a way; (iii) it is epistemologically untenable since no convincing account 
can be formulated about how to compare the mental sensation with its distal 
cause in an epistemologically signifi cant way (Berkeley’s problem) – all talk 
of correspondence in this context is just empty gesturing to Jacobi. Once a 
mental interface has been introduced, reality cannot be regained by artifi cial 
18 Cf. DH, pp. 36 ff; PW, p. 552 ff.
19 Cf. DH, p. 34; PW, p. 551, where Jacobi states his “basic premise” as follows: “my 
doctrine […] is based on the presupposition that there is perception understood in the 
strongest sense, and that its actuality and truth, even though it is an incomprehensible 
miracle, must none the less be accepted absolutely […].”
20 Cf. PW, p. 551.
21 Cf. DH, p. 39 ff, p. 140 ff; PW, p. 553 ff., p.263 ff. 
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means like an inference to the best explanation; every such attempt – that is 
Jacobi’s basic point – comes necessarily too late. 
(c) an anti-skeptical realism: Jacobi fl atly concedes that it is impossible 
to refute the skeptic on his own terms. But this is not detrimental – since 
Jacobi persistently argues that there is simply no need to accept the skep-
tic’s terms. First, the burden of proof is on the shoulders of the skeptic, he 
is “the attacking party that tries to disturb us in our inherited possessions 
through his pretensions” (LS, p. 120). It is the skeptic who has to formulate 
arguments that stand on a fi rmer basis than our natural confi dence in the 
openness of reality to our perceptive capacities – a task doomed to failure 
from the start. Second, Jacobi denies that dreaming and waking stand in a 
symmetric relation to one another: “[w]hoever has never been awake, could 
never dream, and it is impossible that there should be original dreams, or 
an original illusion” (DH, p. 233; PW, p. 305).22 This asymmetry thesis is 
based both systematically and in the course of Jacobi’s argument on his direct 
realism: if the contact with reality always requires the mediation of mental 
entities [Vorstellungen], than it would indeed be an open question whether 
the entity that these mental entities pretend to be about really exist in reality. 
But this picture, as we have seen, already presupposes more concessions to 
the skeptic than Jacobi is ready to make: According to him we are already 
in contact with reality through our perceptual capacities, Sinnlichkeit and 
Vernunft. It is precisely in this anti-skeptical context that Jacobi gives the 
most straightforward statement of his direct realism. What his interlocutor 
is never to forget nor to call into question is the fact that “the cognition of 
the actual outside us is given directly through the presentation of the actual 
itself, without any other means of cognition entering in between” (DH, 
p. 230; PW, p. 304). Perceptual illusions, dreams which appear indistin-
guishable from waking states, are intelligible only as derivative cases which 
presuppose this immediate contact with reality. Jacobi ends his discussion in 
David Hume with a distinction between two kinds of dreams: Whereas we 
awake from our common dreams which usually deceive us only for a time, 
we are more and more drawn into philosophical dreams which perpetually 
substitute themselves for reality. (DH, p. 236; PW, pp. 306-307) As victims 
of philosophy we end up walking through the world like “most miraculous 
somnambulists” – at our own risk. (DH, p. 236; PW, pp. 306-307)
For all its subtlety, Jacobi’s epistemology founders on one fundamental 
problem. We have seen that for Jacobi reality itself is open to our perceptual 
capacities. This fundamental fact eludes any further justifi ability by philo-
22 Compare one of Jacobi’s characteristic puns: “Being awake is not distinguishable from 
dreaming, but dreaming is quite distinguishable from being awake” (DH, p. 229; PW, 
p. 304).
Bereitgestellt von | UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zürich
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 11.12.17 11:32
270   Christoph Halbig
sophical means – but this is not detrimental since there is no need for such 
a justifi cation: “[…] the actuality that reveals itself to the outer sense needs 
no guarantor, since it is itself the most powerful representative of its truth 
[…].”23 This core statement of Jacobi’s realism invites the rejoinder that his 
talk of a reality that bears witness in its own case is at best hopelessly meta-
phorical. It is of course possible to understand it in a purely negative way: 
as we have seen it is one of Jacobi’s central claims that any philosophical 
attempt to regain access to an mind-independent reality necessarily fails once 
it has been shut out by introducing mental entities as the immediate objects 
of our intentional attitudes.24 In the same vein Jacobi certainly tries to remind 
us that any foothold which we artifi cially build up in order to defend our 
natural realism against skeptical doubts is weaker than the one we always 
stand on as a matter of course. This negative reading, however, leaves open 
the question as to how reality as something (according to Jabobi’s premises) 
non-conceptually Given through our perceptual capacities should be able to 
play an epistemic role in the justifi cation of our beliefs: Justifi cation is an es-
sentially normative relation between conceptual contents. The problem Jacobi 
faces here has regained some prominence in recent debates under the head-
ing “Myth of the Given.”25 It becomes even more pressing for Jacobi since 
he explicitly shares its premises: on the one hand he concedes that thinking 
is basically a judgemental activity which presupposes conceptual contents. 
Perception without the understanding, i. e. devoid of conceptual content, is, as 
Jacobi himself confesses, an epistemological Unding. (DH, p. 109 f.; PW, p. 
583 f.) On the other hand he claims: “No demonstration counts against the 
intuition of the senses, since every demonstration is only the bringing of the 
concept back to the sense intuition (empirical or pure) that justifi es it. With 
respect to the knowledge of nature, this intuition is what is fi rst and last, 
what is unconditionally valid, the absolute” (DH, p. 59; PW, p. 563). What 
is given through our perceptual capacities is supposed to be exempt from the 
skeptical doubts that infect the conceptual sphere of understanding while at 
the same time providing the external standard of our judgmental activity – the 
fi nal court of appeal of epistemic justifi cation. But this just means that it 
has to play two obviously incompatible roles: It is endowed with normative 
23 Cf. DH, p. 107; PW, p. 582.
24 Jacobi vividly describes the disastrous consequences of such (pseudo-)scientific attempts: 
“The moment man sought to establish scientifically the veracity of our representations 
of a material world that exists beyond them, and independently of them, at that very 
moment the object that the demonstrators wanted to ground disappeared before their 
eyes. They were left with mere subjectivity, with sensation. And thus they discovered 
idealism” (DH, p. 108; PW, p. 583).
25 Cf. McDowell, 1994, pp. 7-9; see also Halbig, 2002, chapter 8.2.1 and Quante, 2002, 
p. 83, for a reading of Jacobi’s theory of immediate knowledge as a version of the 
Myth of the Given. 
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signifi cance as the basis of epistemic justifi cation against which no appeal is 
possible and at the same time it is placed outside the sphere of the concep-
tual. Jacobi’s repeated assurances that perception is, although non-conceptual, 
nonetheless “simply revelatory, making positive proclamations” (DH, p. 58; 
PW, 562)26 do not help at all. In order to pronounce the epistemically fi nal 
verdict, the deliverances of our perceptual capacities have to be what they 
are by assumption not allowed to be – conceptually structured. So Jacobi’s 
attempt to outline an epistemological theory that provides the necessary 
foundations for an undisturbed common sense ultimately fails. 
3. Intimidated Polyphemus: Jacobi’s metaphilosophy
After this sketch of Jacobi’s own philosophical stance as a “decided realist,” 
his critique of philosophy can now be put into proper perspective: despite 
the serious problems which beset his own theory, there can at this point be 
no doubt that Jacobi himself is far from giving up philosophy in the sense 
of rational inquiry. Although he is occasionally swept away by the force of 
his own polemics, he remains committed to the standards of terminological 
clarity and rigorous argument (the occasional collapses of which at crucial 
stages of his argument he himself is the fi rst to regret). What his critique of 
philosophy is really aiming at is a well-defi ned phenomenon in the history 
of thought, whose defi ning features have, however, to be gathered from the 
various lines of attack Jacobi launches against his changing opponents. What 
are these defi ning features of philosophy in Jacobi’s view?
Prior to the discussion of its content, Jacobi considers philosophy to be 
an essentially defensive stance: philosophers are people who, as Jacobi puts 
it in an ingenious jeu des mots, “lassen nichts auf sich, aber auch wenig 
an sich kommen” (Jacobi, V, p. 113). They are looking for a place which 
is safe from skeptical doubts while at the same time arguing from a basis 
shared by the skeptic. This however, Jacobi suggests, necessarily leads to an 
unacceptable impoverishment of our epistemic capacities, an impoverishment 
implied by the very project of philosophy. This consequence follows in two 
related steps:
(a) In trying to defend themselves against skeptical doubts, philosophers 
implicitly adopt their opponent’s standards. They try to establish a theory 
of knowledge which allows us to prove our epistemic claims. This project 
of a “Wissenschaft der Erkenntnis” (a science of knowledge) according to 
Jacobi, however, gives the game away to the skeptic in its very attempt to 
lay secure and unassailable foundations. Scientifi c knowledge is defi ned by 
Jacobi as the attempt to analyze the conditions under which something is 
26 My translation, C.H.
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possible. At the ideal limit of knowledge we have understood these condi-
tions so well that we are able to construct the entity under consideration. 
In this respect Jacobi is in full, if somewhat ironic, agreement with Fichte: 
for both of them, as Jacobi remarks in his Letter to Fichte, “science as such 
consists in the autonomous production of its object” (Jacobi, 1972, p. 231; 
PW, p. 505). Or, as Jacobi puts in the programmatic Supplement VII to his 
Letters on the Doctrine of Spinoza: our philosophical understanding fails to 
go beyond our own activity of construction.27
(b) At this point it is already obvious why the project of an anti-skeptical, 
realist theory of perceptual knowledge is doomed to be a self-undermining 
endeavor. What is to be proved by the realist is the existence and epistemic 
accessibility of external things as independent of the subject. If we keep in 
mind Jacobi’s premises, however, it is not diffi cult to see why anti-skeptical 
theorizing leads directly to subjective idealism: the content of the proof is 
obliterated here by the very logic of proving which proceeds by making things 
dependent on the constructive activity of the subject. For the independence of 
this activity is precisely what the realist wants to have. When he has managed 
to prove the epistemological accessibility of external things against the skeptic, 
he has ipso facto lost their ontological independence and has thus given up 
his own position. Once one has accepted Jacobi’s overall framework, there 
is no way out of this dilemma for the philosophically ambitious realist.
What is left to the philosopher is just the renunciation of any epistemic 
claims involving genuine cognitive contact with the world – a disastrous 
result that according to Jacobi should call into question the very idea of 
meeting the skeptic on his own ground and allowing him to formulate the 
rules of the game. 
At this point we have implicitly assembled all the elements that make up 
Jacobi’s poignant allegory of the philosopher as a Polyphemus in the 1815 
preface to his David Hume. A brief look at the differences between Homer’s 
Polyphemus and Jacobi’s philosophizing Polyphemus leads to the heart of the 
allegory that summarizes Jacobi’s metaphilosophical stance. A Polyphemus 
(Cyclops), as described in the Odyssey, has only one eye in the middle of his 
forehead. His perceptual capacities are seriously impaired: he lacks binocular 
vision. The Philosopher-Polyphemus however, as we have seen, has, unlike 
his cousin in the Odyssey, fallen victim to an act of self-mutilation: since 
he continues to be under the spell of skeptical demands of what counts as 
a proof he even experiences this partial loss of his vision as a gain in clar-
ity: “They [the Philosopher-Polyphemuses] actually gouged out this one eye 
of the soul, the one turned above the senses, and discovered that without 
it everything stood there for them much more clearly and distinctly than 
before.” (Jacobi, II, p. 74; PW, p. 569)
27 Cf. Supplement VII, p. 249.
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One might object that the soul’s eye mentioned here, a “spiritual eye 
for spiritual objects,”28 is in no way part of the normal epistemic capacities 
that defi ne the common sense standpoint and concern us here. But Jacobi’s 
critique also applies to perception in the ordinary sense of the word: “Thus 
did the understanding invent its twofold unbelief, fi rst in a material world, 
and then in an immaterial and spiritual one as well; and it called the art 
of losing all the truth (for that was its invention) Philosophy.” (Jacobi, II, 
p. 100; PW, p. 579)
The philosopher teaches us how to lose not only the perception of God 
through reason but also the perception of the ordinary reality surrounding 
us. Even worse than that: the Philosopher-Polyphemus, again unlike his 
cousin in the Odyssey, manages to talk his normally-sighted compatriots 
into experiencing their binocular vision as pathological state which requires 
healing: “These Polyphemuses found an audience and, among all too many, 
credence as well. And these then all wanted to be healed of the pathological 
double vision, and of the false eye.” (Jacobi, II, p. 75; PW, p. 569)
What started as a philosophical disease infects the self-understanding of 
common sense through trickle-down processes: the burden of proof lies now 
on the shoulders of those who try to maintain their confi dence in a phe-
nomenology of perception that suggests a direct contact with the perceived 
reality.29
Before turning to Hegel’s critique of Jacobi in the “Third Position of 
Thought about Objectivity” and his “Jacobi-Review,” let me sum up the 
key elements of Jacobi’s critical stance towards philosophy: philosophy in 
the pejorative sense brings about an impoverishment of our epistemic facul-
ties by measuring them against self-imposed standards they cannot meet. 
The internal logic of what it means to refute the skeptic by a proof of the 
existence and epistemic accessibility of external objects turns out, as we have 
seen, to be self-undermining. Instead of reviewing his premises, especially the 
role of proof in this context, which have led to this disastrous result, the 
philosopher reinterprets by a simple sleight of hand the loss of contact with 
the world as a gain in “clarity.” “Clarity” of course means nothing more 
here than the purely methodological virtue of arguing on a basis shared even 
by the skeptic. By trickle-down processes, the standpoint of common-sense 
is transformed in that it adopts the standards of philosophy, although they 
28 Cf. Jacobi, II, p. 74; PW, p. 569.
29 In other places Jacobi utters some doubts about how far this philosophically induced 
transformation of common sense can actually go: “For it is certainly possible for man 
in his foolishness to disavow reason or deny faith in it. But he cannot silence it com-
pletely, or prevent it from still being effective in him” (Jacobi, II, p. 102; PW, p. 581). 
If reason can never be completely lost, philosophically infected common sense seems 
to be condemned to a perpetual “unhappy consciousness”: it denies itself epistemic 
claims that it is nonetheless naturally driven to make. 
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are manifestly in confl ict with the phenomenological evidence. How far this 
process can actually go is not entirely clear from the texts. 
Jacobi’s own position, however, is continually oscillating between two 
points: on the one hand, he reclaims from his philosophizing opponents the 
“natural faith in reason” [natürliche Vernunftglaube] that is simply not in 
need of theory supporting it. His violent rhetoric against philosophy itself 
as the “art to lose all truth” is part of this endeavor. On the other hand, 
he crosses the border from purely therapeutic to constructive philosophy by 
elaborating (at least in outline) his own version of epistemological realism, 
which is itself one competing position in the fi eld of philosophical theories 
and is, as we have seen, beset with its own diffi culties. 
4. Hegel’ s critique of Jacobi – what its aim is not 
Hegel’s critique of “immediate knowledge” is, as I am now going to show, 
not leveled at the content of Jacobi’s realist epistemology but rather at Jacobi’s 
understanding of his own method. The exchange between Jacobi and Hegel 
has nearly always been understood as a debate between a naive, dogmatic 
realist who shuns philosophical argument and an idealist who somehow 
tries to show the inconsistencies of such a position in order to prepare for 
the exposition of his own diametrically opposed theory. In my view, both 
Jacobi and Hegel are convinced of the truth of direct epistemological realism 
though for radically different reasons. What Hegel really tries to show is that 
the essential and true idea of our perceptual capacities as being open to the 
world without interceding mental entities can be consistently defended only 
as part of his own metaphysics of absolute idealism. What is really at stake 
in the debate is the status of philosophy in the defense of common sense 
against “philosophy” in Jacobi’s terminological sense (which marks out an 
opponent for Hegel as well). 
Two points on which Hegel fully agrees with Jacobi’s defense of common 
sense against the pretensions of philosophy deserve explicit mention: 
First, he concedes that philosophy cannot simply supplant common sense: 
it has to be shown instead that “its [sc. philosophy’s] maxims are facts of 
consciousness, and thus in harmony with experience” (UW, § 64 A). Show-
ing this is of course not part of philosophical method itself; the idea of a 
refl ective equilibrium between common sense intuitions on the one hand and 
philosophical principles on the other is completely alien to Hegel’s program. 
What Hegel’s claim does imply, however, is that the standpoint of common 
sense has to be sublated into philosophy in the full sense of the term. He-
gel’s critics have tended to emphasize only the destructive side of aufheben 
(to sublate). Horstmann’s defi nition of the task of philosophy as leading to 
the self-abandonment and self-destruction of common sense30 seems hardly 
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compatible with Hegel’s idea that common sense must be able to recognize 
its own implicit assumptions in their reconstructed form as part of the 
philosophical system.
Second, Hegel explicitly warns in the methodologically crucial § 2 of 
his introduction to the Lesser Logic against a way of asking too much of 
philosophy. Philosophy is defi ned there as a species of Nachdenken which is 
refl ectively turned back on object-directed acts of Denken. At this point one 
could, Hegel suggests, be tempted to think that our fi rst-level, object-directed 
epistemic capacities depend for their very functioning on the refl ective theoriz-
ing of Nachdenken. Hegel, however, rejects such a temptation by a reductio 
ad absurdum of a structurally similar line of argument in the philosophy 
of religion: it would imply in the fi eld of religion that an understanding of 
metaphysical proofs of the existence of God would be essential [wesentlich] 
to faith and the conviction of God’s existence. The “pious peasant” would 
thus be an incoherent idea. The epistemological equivalent of this idea would 
be that we cannot trust our ordinary epistemic capacities until their reli-
ability is proven by philosophical theorizing that, for example, conclusively 
shields us from skeptical doubts. Something along these lines is exactly the 
emphatic idea of philosophy’s role often attributed to Hegel. Hegel himself, 
however, dismisses such an idea as simply an empty dream. He concedes that 
it would heighten the “usefulness” of philosophy to a point of “absolute 
and universal indispensability” – but such a philosophy that would pretend 
to make possible our epistemic contact with reality in the fi rst place would, 
instead of being indispensable, simply not exist at all. (Enc., § 2 A) Some-
one who waits for philosophy until he trusts his senses is, in one of Hegel’s 
favorite but widely ignored similes, like someone who waits to digest until 
he has studied a textbook in physiology. (The pertinence of this point for 
our subject is further confi rmed by the fact that Hegel repeats this simile in 
the same context in his Jacobi-review. [JW, p. 437])
5. […] and what its aim is: philosophizing without 
philosophy then and now
If Hegel drops the ambition of showing that our epistemic capacities depend 
for their proper functioning on philosophical theorizing, and if he explicitly 
asks for the Aufhebung of the common sense perspective into his own system, 
30 Cf. Horstmann, 1991, p. 39 ff.: “Insofern trägt für Hegel die Philosophie nicht mehr 
wie für Kant, Fichte und Schelling dazu bei, das natürliche Bewußtsein über den Sinn, 
das Recht und die Herkunft gewisser fundamentaler Annahmen seiner selbst aufzu-
klären, sie hat jetzt in Bezug auf dieses Bewußtsein hauptsächlich die Funktion, es zur 
Selbstaufgabe, zur Selbstüberwindung und zur Selbstdestruktion anzuleiten.” 
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not only in the sense of destruction but also in that of preservation, what is 
the point of his vehement attack on Jacobi’s “philosophy of immediacy”? 
As we have seen, the attack is not directed against the content of this 
philosophy. Hegel considers it to be an inherent irony of Jacobi’s philosophy 
that it lacks the resources “to recognize his own viewpoint […] in those 
expressions and fi gures that differ from his own, but which, while having 
the same content, the same material results, have thought and the concept as 
their own soul” (JW, p. 456). What Jacobi has grasped only in the epistemo-
logically defi cient mode of Anschauung he himself, Hegel suggests, restates 
in its proper systematic form. We have already seen that the defense of a 
natural realism against skeptics, representationalists and the hypertrophical 
pretensions of philosophy forms this point of convergence of their respective 
epistemologies. 
The real target of Hegel’s critique is the form of Jacobi’s philosophy.31 
What Hegel considers to be the defi ning feature of this philosophy – and at 
the same time the reason why he marks it out as the subject of discussion in 
his methodological Preliminary Notion [Vorbegriff ] to the Lesser Logic – is 
the thesis “that immediate knowledge alone, to the total exclusion of media-
tion, can possess a content which is true” (UW, § 65). Hegel’s own theory 
of the determinate negation obviously lurks in the background here: Jacobi 
mistakenly thinks that the negation of mediation just restores immediacy, 
instead of acknowledging that the immediacy which results from the nega-
tion does not just coincide with the immediacy left behind by the mediation. 
But even if one hesitates to accept Hegel’s speculative theory of determinate 
negation it is still possible to see the point of his critique.
According to Hegel, Jacobi’s position proves to be ultimately unstable 
because at crucial points it has to have recourse to philosophical arguments 
that it itself considers at best superfl uous and at worst as compromising 
the attempted defense of common sense. Or, to put it in Putnam’s terms: 
Jacobi’s naiveté is a second naiveté that can only pretend to be the original 
naiveté.
Hegel develops three distinct lines of attack against Jacobi that on closer 
inspection turn out to be simply variations on this central theme.
First of all, he criticizes Jacobi’s equivocation on the notion of faith:32 
As a matter of fact the concept of faith has to play two incompatible roles 
in his epistemology, an ambiguity which according to Hegel is simply cov-
ered up by playing on the different connotations of the term. On the one 
hand, Glauben in common usage is understood as an alternative to Wissen. 
(Recall the German proverb: Glauben heißt nicht Wissen [To believe is not 
to know].) Jacobi helps himself to this sense of Glauben when he tries to 
31 For this contrast of form and content see JW, p. 452 f.
32 Cf. UW, § 63 A.
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present the powers of belief [Glaubenskräfte], Vernunft and Sinnlichkeit, as 
being so unlike the judgmental activity of the Verstand that they both provide 
an unquestionable access to reality and are unassailable by the skeptic. On 
the other hand, what is believed, in the sense of what forms the content of 
the two perceptual capacities, is supposed to provide the foundations of our 
epistemic activity. In this function Glauben, Hegel observes, turns out to be 
just a special kind of knowledge, i. e. “immediate knowledge” [unmittelbares 
Wissen] (UW, § 63A). Now Hegel simply presses the point that Jacobi cannot 
have it both ways: unfortunately he drives his point home only regarding 
Vernunft as the capacity to perceive infi nite objects. If he had directed his 
critique against sensibility he would have exposed precisely the basic structural 
diffi culty that we have discussed above under the heading of the “Myth of 
the Given” and that is indeed covered up in Jacobi by his ambiguous use of 
Glaube and Anschauung. 
Second, Hegel accuses Jacobi of failing to understand the importance of 
theory in general and the status of his own theorizing in particular. Both 
philosophers agree that our epistemic capacities are not in need of theory in 
order to function properly. Jacobi however mistakenly thinks that every at-
tempt at theorizing about these capacities necessarily undermines our natural 
confi dence in them. Since he identifi es, as we have seen, the conceptual think-
ing of the understanding with the constructive activity of the subject, he has 
to conclude that arguments prove a priori useless for the task of defending a 
realistic attitude towards God and our natural environment. Immediate con-
tact with reality can be regained only in the “form of an external disparage-
ment and dismissal of the mediation” (JW, p. 436). What is left here however, 
Hegel objects, is not, as Jacobi suggests, the absence of theory, but an act of 
theorizing that is not self-conscious. Unfortunately, Hegel’s repeated attacks 
on common sense or gesunden Menschenverstand have been often misun-
derstood as a critique of the realist content of these stances. What they are 
really aimed at, however, is the idea that the common sense already contains 
its own theory. “All these forms agree in adopting as their leading principle 
[my emphasis, C.H.] the immediacy, or self-evident way, in which a factor 
or body of truths is presented in consciousness” (UW, § 63A.). Now this is 
exactly what Jacobi has to suggest, viz. that common sense, once freed of the 
Verstandesphilosophie, takes care of itself and simply becomes the mouthpiece 
of reality that speaks for itself. Jacobi himself, however, has given us ample 
reasons to mistrust common sense as an amateur theorizer by hinting at the 
ways in which it has already become infected by misleading philosophical 
theories. Who guarantees, Hegel implicitly asks, that the form of common 
sense Jacobi tries to defend is not already the result of philosophical errors 
which have been so successfully assimilated that they are not recognizable 
as such any longer? Answering such a question requires exactly the kind of 
philosophical arguments that Jacobi has deliberately renounced. 
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Third, Hegel shows by examples that Jacobi’s claim to “leave everything 
as it is” fails. Ironically Jacobi’s epistemology of immediate knowledge would 
lead to a far-reaching revision of our moral, religious and epistemic practices. 
Thrown back on the resources of what is simply given through either Vernunft 
or Sinnlichkeit, Hegel argues, common sense would hardly recognize itself. 
Since I have discussed this line of argument elsewhere,33 I shall not elaborate 
on this point any further in this essay. 
According to Hegel, Jacobi’s philosophy ultimately comes down to the 
vain attempt “to philosophize and to want to have a philosophy without 
philosophy” (JW, p. 439). For him the failure of Jacobi’s decided realism 
shows that there are only two consistent alternatives: 
Either one opts out of philosophical thinking and just relies on the natural 
realism as implied by our common sense picture of the world. In this case 
one is epistemically safe – as we have already seen, Hegel explicitly acknowl-
edges that common sense already contains the whole content of speculative 
philosophy34 – but one should drop the pretense of being able to prove the 
rational credentials of common sense against epistemological challenges.35
Or one takes up this task and thus enters the fi eld of philosophical ar-
gument. Since Hegel emphatically maintains the idealistic idea of a system 
as the only scientifi c form philosophy can take, this means that one has to 
show how all reality is grounded in one fundamental principle. This princi-
ple, of course, Hegel fi nds in subjectivity; the ontological and epistemologi-
cal peculiarities of self-consciousness provide the model for the Idea as the 
key principle of his monistic metaphysics.36 If both the knowing subject and 
nature as what is known are but stages in the self-unfolding of the Idea, the 
dichotomy between idealism and realism has been, Hegel claims, overcome 
although the partial truth of both positions is preserved: Nature is indeed 
the other of the knowing subject and in no ways dependent on its mental 
acts; so common sense rightly feels passive towards it. But nature qua realm 
of “objective thoughts” (Enc., § 24) also realizes the very same conceptual 
structure as the one on which our judgmental activity as subjects relies. That 
metaphysical point lies at the heart of Hegel’s direct realism and his identity 
theory of truth: The subject of knowledge is for Hegel the subject that has 
realized its notion (in the teleological cum normative sense of the word), i. e. 
33 Cf. Halbig, 2002, chapter 8.4.
34 Cf. Enc., § 27. 
35 Cf. the aphorism in Hegel’s wastebook (1803-1806) which succinctly states both his 
defense of common sense and his rejection of a common sense philosophy: “Der Adel 
in Deutschland hat wohl auch gesunden Menschenverstand, aber eben darum braucht 
er ihn geradezu, ohne zu beweisen, daß er gebraucht werden dürfe – als wobei jene 
[sc. the defenders of a common sense philosophy who ironically have to disavow their 
own philosophizing] stehen bleiben” (MM 2, p. 544).
36 Cf. Halbig / Quante, 2000, § 5. 
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reason: “It knows that what is thought, is; and that what is, only is in so 
far as it is a thought” (Enc., § 465). The content of our successful epistemic 
acts is nothing other than the conceptual structure constitutive of what is 
known.37 Nature and the cognizing subject presuppose (in the technical sense 
of presupposition as defi ned in Hegel’s Logic of Essence) one another: the 
conceptual activity that nature is reaches awareness in the subject; the subject, 
on the other hand, is qua fi nite not identical with an intuitive intellect – it 
has to presuppose the existence of nature as independent of itself.38 
In one sense, the natural realism of our common sense perspective has 
actually been regained at this point: the intuition that there is a reality in-
dependent of our mental acts which is directly (i. e. without any intervening 
“mental intermediaries”) open to our cognition has been justifi ed as a neces-
sary implication of what Spirit means. At the same time, however, common 
sense proves from the vantage point of philosophy to be only a partial and 
therefore limited perspective. Whereas common sense holds that its judge-
ments are made true by what there simply is (a sense of truth discussed by 
Hegel under the heading of Richtigkeit), philosophy proves that Spirit, as 
the ontological level of the knowing and acting subject, is itself the truth 
(now in the ontological sense of truth Hegel discusses under the heading of 
Wahrheit)39 of nature as a defi cient mode of being which calls for subjectiv-
ity in order to reach awareness of itself and thus realizes its own notion in 
a more adequate way precisely by transcending itself. From the perspective 
of philosophy, only the Idea itself as the category system analyzed in the 
Science of Logic is true simpliciter in this ontological sense. This does not 
imply that we get it all wrong in our daily, non-philosophical judgments. 
From an epistemological point they are completely right [richtig]; they are 
wrong only insofar as their objects are only fi nite parts of the Idea and 
thus ontologically speaking untrue; a sense of wrongness inherited by the 
judgments, which, however, offers no consolation to the skeptic – on the 
contrary. Since he demonstrates the way in which common sense forms a 
necessary perspective within the all-encompassing system of the Idea, Hegel 
avails himself of the strongest type of epistemological justifi cation possible. 
The natural realism of common sense as analyzed in the chapter “The Idea 
of Cognition” in the Science of Logic itself forms a necessary moment of the 
37 Jacobi’s problem of how to cope with the outside border of the conceptual just dis-
appears in this metaphysical setting. If there is nothing but the process of conceptual 
differentiation, there is a fortiori no preconceptual Given (though there is of course 
an essential passivity to our epistemic acts; in this sense Hegel agrees with the dictum: 
nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit antea in sensu) whose epistemological role could 
then become problematic.
38 Cf. Enc., § 384. 
39 For an account of both dimensions of Hegel’s theory of truth and the way they are 
related see Halbig, 2002, chapter 5. 
Bereitgestellt von | UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zürich
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 11.12.17 11:32
280   Christoph Halbig
complete, all-encompassing categorical system which constitutes all reality 
and precedes even the distinction of subjectivity and objectivity, which are 
only stages in the process of its own unfolding. 
If Hegel is right, there is no middle ground between a fi rst naiveté on the 
one hand and his own philosophical system on the other (which of course 
encompasses this fi rst naiveté by assigning it its place within the overall 
structure of the Idea). This might sound like a ridiculously strong claim 
which, however, should be distinguished from a weaker claim – also made 
by Hegel – that philosophy can not really be content with a purely therapeu-
tic role. Jacobi’s metaphor of the Polyphemus suggests in this context that 
we simply have to resist homemade philosophical problems and keep our 
eyes – both of them – open. At a time when common sense is beleaguered 
not so much by a marginalized academic philosophy as by a massive impe-
rialism of the scientifi c picture (Sellars) that fl atly contradicts or is at least 
in tension with central convictions of common sense, there seems to me to 
be little evidence for such optimism. What seems to be called for at this 
point is better constructive philosophy, not the self-destruction of construc-
tive philosophy in favor of a therapy that contents itself with the attempt to 
regain the perspective of an undistorted common sense. Recent discussions 
of the role of concepts in experience, of the concept of a “second nature” 
as an alternative to the reductive imperialism of the scientifi c image, and of 
the rehabilitation of an evaluative dimension of reality, would seem to be 
appropriate examples. Trying to camoufl age these philosophical endeavors in 
the drapery of anti-philosophical quietism is not only another example of the 
vain attempt to have it both ways that Hegel already criticized in Jacobi. It 
also, as Hegel shows in his critique, makes more diffi cult the essential task of 
critically refl ecting on one’s own philosophical premises. Hegel’s philosophy 
rests on the assumption that nothing less than a system of philosophy is re-
quired once such a task has become inevitable. It thus provides an example 
of constructive philosophy in the most emphatic sense,40 one which under-
stands common sense, the natural sciences and philosophy itself as necessary, 
though in their respective ways limited, epistemic perspectives within the 
self-explaining, internally grounded structure of the Idea and is therefore 
capable of adjudicating their respective claims. Whether common sense can 
still recognize itself (even in its sublated form) in a philosophical system that 
is capable of meeting these requirements on a philosophical system, remains 
an open question which has to be addressed to Hegel. It is not merely from 
within an Hegelian perspective, however, that there is little hope that the 
second naiveté will simply coincide with the fi rst, if only homemade philo-
sophical doubts have been silenced. Hegel himself comments in this context 
40 Pace McDowell, see above p. 2 and note 8.
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on a word of Christ: “And so the words of Christ: ‘Except ye become as 
little children,’ etc., are very far from telling us that we must always remain 
children” (Enc., § 24 Z). Whether these words tell us, however, – as Hegel 
tries to convince us in his critique of Jacobi – that we have (at least under 
the conditions of modern culture) to go as far as a system of philosophy 
without fi nding a stable stopping place in between, remains the crucial ques-
tion which has to be addressed to Hegel’s philosophy as a whole. 
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